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This special issue on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s aesthetics marks the beginning of a new era for 
Estetika. Starting with this issue, Estetika will be published by Helsinki University Press in 
collaboration with the Faculty of Arts at Charles University in Prague. Also the name of the 
journal has been slightly modified and from now on it will be Estetika: The European Journal 
of Aesthetics. We are pleased to continue to develop Estetika as an open access journal of the 
highest academic standard in collaboration with Helsinki University Press, a university press 
that is committed to the ideals of open science and making publically funded research avail-
able to all. The journal will continue to use triple blind peer review, which Estetika adopted 
already in 2012.
As anyone familiar with Wittgenstein’s philosophy knows, there is no sustained and com-
prehensive treatment of aesthetics in the corpus of his writings. This does not mean that 
Wittgenstein has no important insights to offer about aesthetics and the arts. Even less does 
it mean that themes central for his thought – the constitution of meaning, the nature of 
linguistic understanding, the relevance of human practices, aspect-seeing, or the criticism of 
essentialism and of naturalism – are not relevant for the field. Some of the classic contribu-
tions to aesthetics, for example by Morris Weitz, Stanley Cavell, or Arthur Danto, have drawn 
on Wittgenstein’s work either by applying it or by reacting against it.
An equally palpable feature of Wittgenstein’s work is that aesthetics and the arts surface 
frequently in his published writings, private diary entries, lecture notes, and conversations 
recorded by his students and friends. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s remarks on topics such as 
the correct way of reading poetry, the difficulty of understanding the aesthetic preferences 
of different cultures and historical periods, and the close analogy between linguistic and 
musical understanding are clearly connected to the themes for which he is mostly known. 
Surprisingly often, they are also presented in close conjunction with what are typically seen 
as his core contributions to philosophy, such as the Tractatus’s picture theory of meaning or 
the Philosophical Investigations’ discussion on rule-following. For example, in the Tractatus, 
ethics-cum-aesthetics as well as logic is claimed to be transcendental; and perhaps the most 
central Tractarian notion, that of a proposition, is illustrated by reference to a musical theme. 
In the Investigations, the understanding of a sentence is aligned with the understanding of a 
musical theme, and in identifying two interconnected aspects of understanding – one where 
the content of the sentence can be rephrased, the other where a rephrase is not available – 
Wittgenstein turns again to music and poetry as examples of the latter case.
In fact, the seeming lack of a systematic treatment of questions specific to aesthetics could 
also be seen as a manifestation of Wittgenstein’s peculiar style of writing philosophy. This is 
the style he himself characterizes by stating that ‘The best that I could write would never be 
more than philosophical remarks’, connecting this tendency to the nature of philosophy itself. 
According to him, ‘the very nature of the investigation […] compels us to travel criss-cross in 
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every direction over a wide field of thought’ (PI, p. 3). I believe that for Wittgenstein himself 
this wide field of thought essentially includes questions about the nature of aesthetic judg-
ment, the role and relevance of the arts for philosophy, and the relation between discursive 
thought and the realm of aesthetics. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s thought does not easily 
line up with mainstream analytic philosophy, which is characterized by strictly defined niches 
of specialized subfields with their distinctive questions and methods. By contrast to a highly 
specialized academic philosophy that takes its lead from the natural sciences, Wittgenstein 
actually compares philosophical work to aesthetic investigation, where the latter means con-
crete engagement with specific aesthetic ‘puzzles’ presented, for example, by harmony and 
counterpoint or architecture.
Most aestheticians working on Wittgenstein have understandably turned to his lectures on 
aesthetics as the primary source of his treatment of the topic. The lecture notes from 1938 
have been available for a long time, and Wittgenstein’s discussion on aesthetic reactions, 
aesthetic puzzles, the role of reasons in aesthetic investigation, and the criticism of psycholo-
gism in aesthetics recorded therein are generally well-known. A recent and important addi-
tion to the material relevant for Wittgenstein’s views on aesthetics is G. E. Moore’s lecture 
notes from 1930 to 1933, published by Cambridge University Press in 2016. Especially in 
the notes from 1933, we find earlier variants of Wittgenstein’s treatment of themes familiar 
from the 1938 lectures. However, by contrast to previously published material (including 
Alice Ambrose’s and Margaret Macdonald’s notes from the 1933 lectures published in 1979), 
Moore’s meticulously recorded notes bring the connection between Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on aesthetics and his developing account of grammar to a sharper focus. In doing so, Moore’s 
notes help us appreciate the significance of aesthetics for Wittgenstein’s broader philosophi-
cal concerns and his conception of philosophy.
The reception of Wittgenstein’s contribution to aesthetics has been as mixed as the recep-
tion of his philosophy in general. When commentators disagree on the very basics – such as 
whether the Tractatus presents a philosophical account of meaning or is designed to under-
mine the very possibility of such an account, or whether the notion of a rule is central in 
Wittgenstein’s later thought – it is no wonder that there are no generally accepted views 
about his aesthetics either. Granted, Wittgenstein’s argumentation is notoriously difficult to 
follow, partly because of his style of writing, partly because of the complicated editorial history 
of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. A case particularly relevant for aesthetics is the much-loved col-
lection Culture and Value, which brings together Wittgenstein’s remarks on the arts, religion, 
and culture. The uninitiated reader may easily approach this book as one of Wittgenstein’s 
works. However, the published remarks have actually been lifted from Wittgenstein’s manu-
scripts at the cost of losing their original context in a potentially broader train of thought. 
So while making Wittgenstein’s remarks on the arts and aesthetics available to the wider 
public and providing easy access to a more ‘general’ or ‘cultural’ side of his thought, the col-
lection may also direct the reader to treat the remarks as isolated aphorisms without broader 
philosophical import. Moreover, what is taken to be important in Wittgenstein’s work often 
reflects the philosophical background of the interpreter. Situating Wittgenstein exclusively 
in the tradition of early analytic philosophy will push into background many important top-
ics that just happen to fall outside of the orbit of that tradition. In turn, focusing exclusively 
Wittgenstein’s background in the Viennese high society and culture may lead to an equally 
one-sided picture of his contribution unless balanced by close attention to his work on phi-
losophy of language and mind.
This special issue of Estetika, dedicated to Wittgenstein, aims at illuminating his work on aes-
thetics from a variety of different perspectives and interpretative traditions but always in rela-
tion to the broader scope of his philosophy. The issue opens with Severin Schroeder’s article 
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‘The Emergence of Wittgenstein’s Views on Aesthetics in the 1933 Lectures’. Schroeder’s arti-
cle traces the development of Wittgenstein’s thought on aesthetics from his early equation 
of ethics and aesthetics in the Tractatus to the lectures on aesthetics from 1933 and 1938. 
Schroeder starts by a detailed exposition of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the meaning of the 
word ‘beautiful’ in 1933. He considers three different analyses of the meaning of ‘beautiful’ 
to be found in Wittgenstein’s lectures: beauty as a common ingredient of ‘beautiful things’, 
beauty as a second-order quality, and beauty as that which elicits a certain feeling – alterna-
tives that are each rejected by Wittgenstein in favor of an investigation directed at the various 
uses of word ‘beautiful’. According to Schroeder, Wittgenstein’s account of ‘beautiful’ differs 
from standard cases of family resemblance words, because by contrast to the paradigm case 
of ‘game’, say, such uses do not only differ with respect to the objects to which ‘beauty’ is 
applied but also with respect to the contexts of application and the relevant criteria applied 
in those contexts. In fact, Schroeder argues, Wittgenstein’s treatment of beauty ultimately 
turns to the criteria of aesthetic judgments, which shows that the initial focus in the notion 
of beauty was not entirely felicitous. Rather, given Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the context of 
aesthetic judgment, what turns out to be more relevant for him is the elusive standards and 
criteria that we presuppose in our aesthetic discussions.
Joachim Schulte’s article provides a close reading of Wittgenstein’s familiar 1930 
remark, published in Culture and Value (CV, p. 6; MS 109) and the way in which it relates 
to Wittgenstein’s philosophy in general. The remark in question opens with a recollection 
of Paul Engelmann and culminates in a claim about art’s ability to foster a contemplative 
sub specie aeterni attitude towards the world. In his article, Schulte engages critically with 
Michael Fried’s interpretation, according to which the remark in question is closely related 
to Wittgenstein’s later ideas of a surveyable representation, the requirement that philosophy 
leave its object of investigation as it is, and the importance of the everyday – notions that 
Fried connects to photography and Jeff Wall’s photography in particular. Schulte notes that 
there is no need to read the remark in the context of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; after 
all, the idea of a sub specie aeterni attitude figures prominently in Wittgenstein’s early writ-
ings. But if the remark is connected with Wittgenstein’s later thought, then a context more 
plausible than that of surveyable representation and the category of everyday is provided by 
Wittgenstein’s idea of aspect change. It is this idea, Schulte argues, that will help us gain a 
better understanding of what Wittgenstein actually means by a perspective that belongs to 
a work of art.
Eran Guter’s ‘The Philosophical Significance of Wittgenstein’s Experiments on Rhythm, 
Cambridge 1912–13’ brings to focus Wittgenstein’s concrete engagement with the arts. 
Placing Wittgenstein’s early empirical experiments on rhythm in a broader scientific and phil-
osophical context, Guter argues that while the implications of that work did not find their 
way to the Tractatus, they became important for Wittgenstein’s philosophy later. Specifically, 
the rhythm experiments served to lay the foundation for Wittgenstein’s later work on notic-
ing an aspect and on different techniques for making comparisons and finding similes. 
Guter’s article also serves to illuminate the phenomenon Wittgenstein calls an aesthetic puz-
zle, for example, the attempt to find the right tempo for a musical performance – a task that 
essentially involves the possibility of hearing something differently. Guter relates this idea 
to Wittgenstein’s discussion on reason-giving in aesthetics as it is presented in the recently 
published lecture notes by G. E. Moore. He argues that, in these lectures, Wittgenstein has 
already given up the hope of solving the question of aesthetic reason-giving by means of 
empirical investigation and has turned his focus on the aesthetic system at hand as the key to 
the problem of musical understanding.
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Vojtěch Kolman’s ‘Wittgenstein and Die Meistersinger’ addresses Wittgenstein’s discussion 
on rule-following by relating it to the way in which rule-following is portrayed in Wagner’s 
opera, famous for its treatment of the role and relevance of rules in art. According to Kolman, 
the alignment between Wittgenstein’s train of thought and Wagner’s opera helps us iden-
tify three available positions on rule-following. In his reading, the extreme solutions to the 
rule-following paradox, portrayed in the opera and the Philosophical Investigations alike, are 
the radical denial of the relevance of rules on the one hand and the idea that rules are fixed 
and a priori on the other. Identifying these two positions with the Humean and the Kantian 
approaches respectively, Kolman suggests that, just like in the opera, in Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment the position to be preferred lies somewhere in between the two extremes. Kolman 
argues that the resulting ‘middle position’ comes close to Hegelian idealism in its emphasis 
on the necessity of the social and practical dimension for the possibility of rule-following.
Andreas Vrahimis’s ‘Wittgenstein and Heidegger against a Science of Aesthetics’ compares 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of naturalism in aesthetics with Martin Heidegger’s treatment of the 
same theme. Situating the debate on what he calls a ‘science of aesthetics’ in the historical 
contexts available for the two philosophers, Vrahimis argues that the key parallel between 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein lies in their respective attempts to clearly separate the enterprise 
of psychology from that of philosophically illuminating investigation of the arts. However, as 
the article shows, the ways in which the two philosophers address the task also come apart. 
While for Heidegger the search for the original essence of the work of art is possible only by 
overcoming aesthetics understood as the study of experiences, Wittgenstein identifies the 
misuse of our language as the root of our temptation to explain aesthetic judgments in causal 
terms. The article closes by an analysis of the relevant points of disagreement in the underly-
ing commitments of the two accounts.
In addition to the research articles, the issue features Oskari Kuusela’s review of Beth 
Savickey’s Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Awakening the Imagination. The issue also includes 
Saul Fisher’s critical note to Peter Lamarque’s and Nigel Walter’s article ‘The Application 
of Narrative to the Conservation of Historic Buildings’, published in Estetika 1/2019, and 
Lamarque’s and Walter’s responses to Fisher. Wittgenstein, who at one point of his life con-
sidered a career in architecture, wrote: ‘Work in philosophy – like work in architecture in 
many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees 
things. (And what one expects of them.)’ (CV, p. 24). I believe that this issue of Estetika will 
provide its readers many opportunities for such work. I would like to thank the authors and 
the members of the community of Wittgenstein scholarship who contributed to this issue as 
referees for making it possible.
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